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Abstract  
China’s growth and its capacity to move in thirty 
years from under-development and extreme 
poverty to an emerging global power and one of 
the largest exporter of manufactured goods has 
attracted the attention of many developing 
countries.  China has served as a development 
model for Africa and an alternative source of 
trade and finance from Africa’s traditional 
development partners. The impact of China on 
African economies has been diverse, depending 
in part on the sectoral composition of each 
country’s production. Overall, China’s increased 
engagement with Africa could generate 
important gains for African economies. This 
paper analyzes the different impacts of China on 
Africa, quantifies the advantages and 
disadvantages, and policy suggestions 
necessary to maximize the development impact 
of China. One overriding consideration is that 
reaping the full benefits from Chinese trade and 
investment will require substantial 
improvements in governance in African 
economies. 
    5
Contents 
1.  Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 6 
2.  China’s Engagement in Africa: A Historical Perspective ............................................................ 6 
3.  China’s International Cooperation Strategy ................................................................................. 9 
4.  China’s Presence in Africa ............................................................................................................ 12 
4.1.  Major China-Africa Trade Trends  ............................................................................................. 12 
4.2.  China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Africa ............................................................................ 18 
5.  Potential Impact of China’s Presence in Africa .......................................................................... 22 





    6
1. Introduction 
China’s growth and its capacity to move in thirty years from under-development and extreme poverty 
to an emerging global power and one of the largest exporter of manufactured goods has attracted the 
attention of many developing countries.  China has served as a development model for Africa and an 
alternative source of trade and finance from Africa’s traditional development partners. The impact of 
China on African economies has been diverse, depending in part on the sectoral composition of each 
country’s production.  Overall, China’s increased engagement with Africa could generate important 
gains for African economies. However, analysis is required to quantify the advantages and 
disadvantages, and to design the policies necessary to maximize the development impact of China. One 
overriding consideration is that reaping the full benefits from Chinese trade and investment will require 
substantial improvements in governance in African economies.  
This paper presents a historical and comparative perspective of the trade and FDI relationship between 
China and Africa. The first section provides an historical overview of Sino-Africa trade and investment 
relationships. The second section discusses China’s overall international economic policies, while the 
third section highlights the evolution of China’s engagement in Africa through trade and investment.  
The fourth section presents a quantitative approach to evaluating the potential benefits of Africa’s trade 
with China. A final section emphasizes the importance of governance in ensuring that African benefits 
from China’s engagement.   
2. China’s Engagement in Africa: A Historical Perspective 
Historically, trade relations between China and Africa date back to the first Han emperors of the 
Second Century B.C.  The best example is the Chinese navigator, Zheng He, who reached the coast of 
Africa four times, disembarking in Somalia and Kenya, in the early 15
th century. However, the period 
of explorations was followed by several centuries of disengagement from the world. Only with the 
establishment of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949 did China take renewed interested in other 
developing countries, in particular after the Bandung Conference. This conference aimed at promoting 
Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and opposition to colonialism. China also supported 
independence movements in various countries (Burma, Malaysia and Vietnam) as well as provided 
economic assistance (Mongolia, North Korea) (Richer, 2008).   7
In the post colonial period, China sought to extend its influence in other developing countries and 
export the communist revolution. The newly independent countries looked to China as an alternative to 
domination by the former colonial powers. For example, China signed an economic and technical 
cooperation agreement with Guinea in 1960, a year after independence; subsequently provided an 
interest-free loan of $20 million to Ghana, the first African country to establish diplomatic relations 
with China; and recognised Mali upon independence and sent a trade mission the following year. These 
three countries were close to China politically. However, China also established relationships with 
other countries, for example in North Africa, with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. China signed an 
economic and technical cooperation agreement with Algeria and granted it a $50 million loan in the 
1950s, although Algeria did not renounce its relations with the Soviet Union.  
Sino-African relations were maintained in the 1960s, and China was present at various Afro-Asian 
Conferences held in Africa. Gradually, such conferences became strongly marked by Sino-Soviet 
differences. The Cultural Revolution in China and various Chinese interventions had a detrimental 
effect on Sino-African relationships, although they did improve in the late 1970s. Relations with China 
offered a number of advantages compared to western countries, as China: (i) demanded fewer 
conditions on providing assistance; (ii) granted assistance at very low rates, repayable over a very long 
period; and (iii) offered training to professional and technical personnel. “The west’s employment of 
conditionalities, merely the latest in the decades of humiliating experiences at the hands of former 
colonial powers and the United States, echoes the humiliations of the “inequal treaties” foisted on 
China by the west in the nineteenth century. Indeed, China’s ability to recognize this is part of the 
genius of its foreign policy endeavours toward Africa” (Alden, 2008, p.20). 
From a political perspective, China gave priority to highly-visible, prestige projects such as stadiums 
and hospitals. China also financed the construction of a railway line between Zambia and Tanzania 
between 1973 and 1976, and dispatched 15,000 Chinese for the project, although this investment was 
earlier turned down by the British Government and the World Bank (Chaponnière, 2008). China’s role 
in providing development assistance, as well as some military support, was striking, in that China was 
even poorer than some African countries. These activities probably contributed to the backing by most 
newly independent countries of China’s efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council in 1971.   8
China’s relationship with Africa changed following the opening up of China’s economy initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping, a dramatic shift from policies followed under Mao. Relations were no longer 
dominated by ideological concerns, except for the sensitive issue of Chinese Taiwan. However, the 
official principles of engagement, including equality among partners, mutual benefit, respect for 
sovereignty, use of interest-free grants and loans, beneficiary capacity building, compliance with 
obligations, provision of equipment made in China and the same living conditions for both Chinese and 
local experts, did not change (Larkin, 1971, Chaponnière, 2009). More recently, China’s growing 
dependence on energy has lead to Africa gaining prominence on China’s agenda.  
Trade between China and Africa has increased dramatically (Figure 1). China’s trade with Africa was 
minimal until 1954. Trade then grew steadily, but did not rise significantly until 1974, before China’s 
opening up. The gradual liberalization of the Chinese economy from 1978 was accompanied by strong 
growth in trade with Africa. 
Figure 1: Trend of Chinese imports and exports with Africa, 1953-2007 
(In percentage of GDP)  
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Figure 2: Share of regional trade with China (1950-2007, X+M in percentage) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from “Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade”, 1984 and “China Statistical Yearbook”, 1985-2008 
Nevertheless, Africa remains a marginal trading partner compared to China’s trade with other regions 
(Figure 2). China’s trading relationships have reflected its political ties: the Soviet Union was China’s 
principal trading partner until the early sixties but bilateral trade then plummeted, and China had no 
trade with the United States from 1951 until President Nixon’s visit in 1972. Western Europe’s trade 
shares have been volatile, but since the mid-sixties Europe has ranked second among China’s partners, 
mainly due to Germany. Asia has had a growing share since the early 1960s, and now accounts for 
more than half of China’s trade. 
3. China’s International Cooperation Strategy  
Until the end of the 1970s China’s trade largely reflected government to government relations rather 
than comparative advantage. However, following Mao’s death and two years of political uncertainty, 
Deng Xiaoping took power and embarked on a spectacularly successful reform program to transform 
China into a market economy open to international competition.  
The opening was gradual, beginning with the establishment of four Special Economic Zones in the 
southern provinces (Guangdong and Fujian) in 1978-1979. China’s trade increased rapidly, notably 
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exports. The spread of trade liberalisation to the rest of the country resulted in a marked increase in 
imports. Despite criticisms from conservatives in China, the essence of the process was no longer 
challenged.  Trade became responsive to market forces, although protection of the domestic market 
remained very strong, with extensive use of tariffs, quotas, and licenses (Lardy, 2002). WTO accession 
further motivated China to lower its protectionist barriers. 
Trade developed rapidly following the 1987 exemption from customs duties of raw materials and 
components destined for re-export. China has drawn heavily on the Southeast Asian development 
model, where components are first imported, then assembled, and finally re-exported, either for further 
processing or directly to markets in developed countries. This trade was boosted by increases in foreign 
investment in the 1990s, aided by the establishment of Special Economic Zones and the role of Hong 
Kong and the Chinese Diaspora.  
The importance of the components trade helps to explain the high level of China’s trade with other 
Asian countries (figure 3). The trade in components has increased the interdependency of Asian 
countries, and was assisted by policies designed to further integration, as reflected in the establishment 
of the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). China’s trade balances also demonstrated the intermediary role 
this country plays in the component trade (Figure 4). China’s increasing trade deficit with Taiwan, 
Korea and Japan, and, to a lesser degree, Malaysia and Philippines, in part reflects the import of 
components that are then transformed into exports to other markets, such as the United States.   
Figure 3: Trend of Chinese total exports and imports for component manufacturing sector, 1981-2007 
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Figure 4: China’s five largest trade surpluses and five largest trade deficits, 1994-2007  
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from “China Yearbook” (1995-2008) 
The trade in components  also explains why China is sometimes considered (Rodrik, 2006) as exporting 
more sophisticated products than countries with the same factor endowments and at lower prices than 
products exported by countries with similar per capita income (Schott, 2008). These trends reflect the 
re-export of sophisticated goods that were initially imported, and not produced in China (Branstetter 
and Lardy 2008). Apart from the trade in components, China’s principal imports are energy and 
primary products (fertilizers, grains, ores, etc), and exports are mainly consumer products with low 
capital intensity, although it is endeavouring to move towards more technology-intensive products. 
Thus it appears that China does specialize in labour-intensive products (or in the case of the trade in 
components, labour-intensive services embodied in products), reflecting the country’s relatively low 
labour costs.  
China’s opening to the outside world has also transformed the global organisation of trade.  China has 
outpaced a number of Asian countries, including Chinese Taiwan and South Korea, in exports to the 
rest of the world, particularly the United States (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008). In addition, the growth 
of foreign trade and investment over the past decade has been guided by the desire to secure energy 
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whether China’s growing interest in Africa fits this global trend, or whether Africa presents a unique 
case in China’s strategy? 
4. China’s Presence in Africa 
China’s relations with African countries, and indeed its global economic strategy, have been shaped by 
the need to obtain energy resources to support economic development. However, political 
considerations have also played an important role. In 1971, African countries were instrumental in 
preventing Chinese Taiwan from obtaining a seat at the United Nations Security Council. And while 
Taipei had until recently retained the support of numerous African countries, China’s diplomatic 
interventions, financial incentives, aid proposals, and military assistance to Africa have been premised 
on receiving countries’ abandoning diplomatic relations with Chinese Taiwan. This strategy has proven 
successful. 
Chinese diplomacy in Africa, in particular that carried out by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, has focused on bilateral relationships with African governments. In addition, several State-
owned banks have backed China’s presence in Africa. Exim Bank (China Export-Import Bank) was 
established in 1994 to promote Chinese exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) specifically in the 
infrastructure sector: roads, power plants, pipelines, telecommunications, etc. (Wang, 2007).  This bank 
has a less risk-sensitive profile compared to private banks, but is still more willing to support some 
investment projects than Western counterparts. China Development Bank (CDB), also established in 
1994, provides loans to Chinese firms and has launched the China-Africa Development Fund to support 
Chinese FDI in Africa. SINOSURE (China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation) has since 2001 
provided insurance against the risks involved in Chinese exports and foreign investment. China’s 
presence in Africa also involves a broad range of private-sector actors, including multinationals, small 
businesses, traders, and migrants, as well as Chinese local governments which at times act directly, 
mainly through the firms they own (Chen and Jian, 2009). In the following section, we will present the 
main features of the reciprocal trade and investment flows between China and Africa. 
4.1. Major China-Africa Trade Trends 
China has emerged as a major trading partner for Africa. While European countries remain Africa’s 
leading trade partners, Europe’s share of Africa’s exports has fallen steadily (figure 5). China’s 
importance as an importer of African goods also has risen (figure 6), while the share of the United   13
States continues to increase and Europe’s share declines. Africa’s share of China’s total exports and 
imports - despite recent increases - remains less than 4 percent (figure 7), and is even smaller for 
manufactured goods (table 1). Trade with China is somewhat more important for Africa, representing 
almost 10 percent of exports and imports.   
Figure 5: Distribution of African exports among the major blocs (1994-2007) 
 
  Source:  IMF, Dots, different years 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of African imports among the major blocs (1994-2007)  
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Figure 7: Africa’s share in total Chinese exports and imports 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, different years, NBS. 
Table 1: Chinese trade in manufactured goods by origin and destination 
  Exports  Imports 
  Share  Annual percentage 
change 
Share  Annual percentage 
change 
 2000  2007  2007  2000 2007  2007 
World 100  100  27  100  100  17 
North America  31.9  27.6  15  11.8  8.7  16 
South and central America  2.5  3.3  15  0.3  0.8  16 
Europe 21.5  26.6  30  17.5  15.5  21 
CIS 1.3  4.0  74  1.9  0.7  23 
Africa 2.0  3.0  41  0.2  0.4  40 
Middle East  2.5  3.7  51  0.7  1.0  19 
Asia 38.3  31.7  25  67.6  72.9  16 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics, 2008. 
China’s trade with Africa is highly concentrated (figure 8). About 60% of Chinese exports are destined 
for only six countries: South Africa (21%), Egypt (12%), Nigeria (10%), Algeria (7%), Morocco (6%) 
and Benin (5%)
2, while over 70% of Chinese imports originate from four countries: Angola (34%), 
                                                 
2 China Exports to Africa: South Africa, 20.95%; Egypt, 11.75%; Nigeria, 10.18%; Algeria, 6.96%; Morocco, 5.76%; 
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Figure 11: Key African imports from China (by country and by product) 
 
























































































































Figure 13: Africa-China balance of trade (10 leading surpluses and 10 leading deficits) 
 
4.2. China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Africa 
As previously highlighted, China’s FDI in Africa is closely linked to trade and development assistance. 
Thus FDI has increased over the past 10 years in tandem with increased Sino-African trade, although 
China’s FDI to Africa remains marginal in terms of China’s total outward FDI flows (0.2% in 1991 and 
5.9% in 2007—Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009) and total FDI received by Africa from the rest of the 
world (3% in 2007
4). According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China’s FDI in Africa has 
increased by 46% per year over the last decade. The stock of foreign investment stood at $4.46 billion 
in 2007 compared to $56 million in 1996.
5  During the first half of 2009, Chinese FDI flows into Africa 
increased by 81% compared to the same period in 2008, reaching over $0.5 billion. However, it is 
difficult to be certain about the level of China’s FDI outflows, as estimates from different sources vary 
widely and Chinese investments are often channeled through off-shore entities registered in places such 
as Hong Kong, Cayman Island and others. 
                                                 
4   Calculated using UNCTAD basic FDI data and “2007 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment” of the PRC Ministry of Commerce. 
5    “Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment”, 2003-2007, PRC Ministry of Commerce. 






















Similarly to trade patterns, China’s outward FDI to Africa is dominated by a few resource-rich 
countries, plus South Africa (figures 14 and 15). From 2003-07, over half of Chinese FDI flows into 
Africa were absorbed by three countries: Nigeria (20.2%), South Africa (19.8%) and Sudan (12.3%). 
Algeria (oil) and Zambia (minerals) came 4th and 5th, respectively. FDI to Nigeria is set to rise: 
according to the Financial Times, China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), a State-owned 
enterprise and one of the three major energy players in China, is negotiating the acquisition of rights to 
1/6
th of Nigeria’s oil reserves.
6  
Figure 14: China’s FDI flows into Africa by 
destination (2003-2007) 
Figure 15: China’s FDI stocks in Africa by 
location (2007) 
 
Source: China Ministry of Commerce, 2008 
Most Chinese enterprises investing in strategic sectors, such as oil, minerals or infrastructure, are state-
owned (by either the central government or local governments-- Chen and Jian, 2009) and receive 
government grants or loans from State-owned banks. These enterprises often manage large investment 
projects (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). For instance, the State-owned China National Petroleum Corp is 
the leading foreign investor in Sudan. Chinese medium- to large-sized enterprises are found mainly in 
the manufactured goods, telecommunications and wholesale trade sectors. Small firms are found mostly 
in the light industry and retail sectors. Although the small firms certainly play an important role and are 
present in most African countries, they are not properly captured in official statistics. 
                                                 























































In 2006, the bulk of FDI flows involved the mining sector (40.74%), business services (21.58%), 
finance (16.4%), transport and telecommunications (6.57%), wholesale and retail trade (6.57%) and 
manufactured goods (4.33%), with the other sectors being only slightly represented. For instance, 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries attracted less than 1% of Chinese FDI (Kiggundu, 2008). In terms of 
stocks, the three leading investors in Africa are State-owned oil companies: China Petrochemical Corp., 
China National Petroleum Corp. and China National Offshore Oil Corp. (Kiggundu, 2008)
7.  
The case of infrastructure is particularly important because the sector is a driver of economic growth; 
the Africa Infrastructure Diagnostic (AICD) study estimated that Africa needs $93 billion per year to 
address the deficit in this sector. Historically, infrastructure was one of the first sectors in which China 
invested in Africa. China has developed industries and competitive services with special expertise in 
the execution of public works, based on constructing large infrastructure projects in China. Over 35 
African countries are engaged with China in infrastructure financing arrangements; the largest 
recipients are Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia (see Figure 16 & 17). China’s commitments to 
infrastructure in Africa rose from $1 billion annually between 2001 and 2003 to $1.5 billion between 
2004 and 2005, and reached $7.5 billion in 2006.
8 For example, China financed 10 hydroelectric power 
projects in 2007, to the tune of $3.3 billion, which increased Africa’s hydroelectric power production 
capacity by 30%. China also has financed $4 billion in investments in road and railway network 
projects, including the rehabilitation of existing railway lines and the construction of new lines. The 
main beneficiaries of such projects are Nigeria, Gabon and Mauritania.  China also contributes to 
Africa’s information and communications infrastructure (nearly $3 billion in total), generally in the 





                                                 
7  It is worth noting that State-owned enterprises or collective enterprises from the Chinese provinces are increasingly 
investing in Africa and, in 2007, accounted for 21% of Chinese investment in Africa; for example, TCL, owner of 
Huizhou City, has invested in electronics in cooperation with Philips and Toshiba.  





















Figure 16: China’s financial Commitments in infrastructure projects in major countries (2001-
2007) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2009 
Source: World Bank, 2009 
While China’s FDI in Africa is likely to continue to be linked to trade, Kapinski and Morris (2009) 
consider that future FDI will focus more on the private sector and the development of small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) in sectors such as telecommunications, business services and 
manufactured goods. China is also using some African countries as a platform for re-exports, largely in 
the apparel industry and focusing on countries that benefit from a non-reciprocal trade agreement, such 
as the “Everything but Arms Agreement” of the European Union and “American Growth and 





















Figure 17: Confirmed Chinese infrastructure financing in Sub-Saharan Africa per 
country (2001-2007)   22
Kapinski and Morris (2009) stress that with the exception of SMEs in search of quick, short-term profit, 
Chinese firms are less averse to risk than their Western counterparts and less constrained by 
environmental and social  concerns. Similarly, Besada and others (2008) emphasize that FDI from 
Western countries is dominated by private firms with limited risk appetite and little long-term 
commitment, while Chinese investments are made with the intention of establishing long-term 
relationships with governments. Given that China’s presence in trade and investment is becoming 
increasingly important for African countries, the next section reviews the effects of China’s presence 
for economic growth and poverty reduction as well as governance and the environment.  
5. Potential Impact of China’s Presence in Africa 
The impact of China’s trade with and investment in China is difficult to determine, in part because 
China’s increased presence is relatively recent and a valid assessment will take several years. 
Moreover, the Africa continent consists of 53 individual countries, with different histories, 
development models and political regimes. For example, Alden (2007) emphasizes the distinction 
between democracies with diversified economies, weak democracies specialised in primary products 
and “pariah” regimes. African countries differ significantly in the extent of economic diversification, 
with Egypt and South Africa the most diversified (and thus probably the least vulnerable), and some of 
the oil exporters totally dependent on oil revenues. The extent of dependence on China’s trade, FDI and 
development assistance differs greatly. African countries also differ according to the importance of 
China compared to that of European countries or the United States.  
China’s success has encouraged a number of African countries to imitate China’s policies. However, 
the Chinese development model is the result of the interaction between a restrictive political system, 
which developed internally, and economic actors largely dependent on that system (cf. for example, 
Naughton, 2008). This experience is not necessarily transferable. Nonetheless, an economic 
relationship with China does provide an alternative to dependence on Western countries. A distinction 
is sometimes made between the “Beijing Consensus’ and the “Washington Consensus”, as many 
Africans seek engagement with China along lines less restrictive than those imposed by European and 
American partners or international organisations. This freedom, however, may also be risky. China may 
be willing to finance projects, for example in infrastructure, that more traditional partners refuse to 
support because they are not sustainable.    23
Many African economies have reaped enormous benefits from China’s rapid growth and increasingly 
important trade links with the continent, although other African countries have suffered from increased 
competition.  Thus trade can generate both gains and losses (Ajakaiye et al., 2009, Ademola et al., 
2009). An analysis of the effect of China’s growth should take into account: (i) increased demand for 
Africa’s exports; (ii) rising commodity prices owing to China’s demand for commodities from the 
global market; (iii) reduced prices on consumer and investment goods in African economies; and (iv) 
reduced demand for African production due to competition from China, in both domestic and third 
markets.  
Thus the impact of China will depend on the commodity specialization of each country. Countries 
exporting labour-intensive goods have reason to fear competition from China, while those exporting 
primary commodities or capital-intensive and technologically advanced goods will gain (Eichengreen 
and Hui, 2006). Countries that export oil, metals, and certain industrial inputs (for example, cotton) will 
enjoy increases in export volumes and prices. Various AERC studies (cf. Ademola et al., 2009) 
conclude that the countries that gain from exporting to China are: (i) Oil exporters: Angola, Chad, 
Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria and Sudan; (ii) Ore and metal exporters: Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; (iii) Cotton exporters: Cameroon, Chad, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mali, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and (iv) log timber exporters: 
Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and South Africa.  
China also has an important impact on African countries’ import prices. African economies benefit 
from the expanded availability and lower prices of consumer goods, for example: transport vehicles 
(South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius, Ethiopia and Nigeria), motor vehicles (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ghana), textiles and apparel (South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria and Gambia) and rice (Nigeria, South 
Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya) (Ademola et al., 2009).  The purchase of capital goods and transport 
equipment at lower prices than products imported from Europe has significantly lowered investment 
costs. This has particularly benefited Africa’s infrastructure sector, where the strong Chinese presence 
relates to both trade and FDI. By contrast, countries importing primary commodities, particularly raw 
materials and energy, suffer from higher prices.  An IMF study covering 21 African countries 
concludes that the increase in primary commodity prices between 2003 and 2004 resulted in a neutral 
trade balance for 14 of the countries. For those countries, the gains from the non-oil primary 
commodity price increase roughly balanced the loss arising from higher oil prices (IMF, 2004).   24
Some African sectors suffer from reduced production and employment owing to competition from 
China, both domestically and in third markets. Ademola (et al. 2009) cites several examples of 
countries with industries that are threatened by Chinese imports, leading to numerous factory closings. 
For example, in the textile industry, South Africa apparently lost between 23 000 and 85 000 jobs. 
Ghana also had to close down businesses. Furthermore, competition in this sector accounts for 
declining trade between African countries, with nations such as South Africa, Cameroon, Kenya and 
Madagascar losing market share in neighbouring countries due to the penetration of Chinese apparel. A 
study on the crowding-out effect of Chinese exports highlights the link between rising Chinese textile 
exports and declining African exports (Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2009). On the whole, in the sectors 
where China and Africa compete, increased Chinese exports translate into reduced African production. 
For some countries, the effects of China trade are mixed.  For example, Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, 
which are cotton exporters, have gained from the rising price of this commodity, but have seen higher 
prices on their oil imports (Zafar, 2007).  
Moreover, there are distributional impacts within African economies: consumers have greater access to 
labour-intensive goods, firms may enjoy lower input costs, while some firms will see demand for their 
production decline.  The impact on poverty may also be mixed: the poor may benefit from increased 
access to low-cost consumer goods, although with the exception of Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania and 
Ethiopia, basic consumer products imported from China account for less than 10% of total imports. 
Poor agricultural labourers working in the production of tradable commodities could see a rise in wages 
and/or employment, while poor urban workers producing consumer goods may see a decline. 
A more detailed empirical analysis can provide more insight into the impact of China’s trade on 
African economies, including how China may influence the development of Africa’s exports going 
forward. One important issue is the extent to which trade with China will encourage further 
specialization in primary commodities, or can help African economies diversify their production 
structure and benefit from the economies of scale, productivity improvements, and more stable prices 
that can accompany increased production of manufactures.  
A first approach to this question is to compare the intensity of trade between selected African  countries 
and China and the African economies’ comparative advantage in particular commodities. The intensity   25
of trade
9 between two countries, i and j, during year t can be calculated as follows (see Calderon et al., 
2007): 
(1)        Ti,j,t= 100 x fi,j,t/(Fi,t+Fj,t) 
Where fi,j,t represents the amount of bilateral trade flows between countries i and j. Fit and Fij represent 
the total trade between countries i and j. This indicator was calculated based on United Nations 
COMTRADE data. The comparative advantage by commodity group was calculated using a widely 
used World Bank index (see Annex 1). The comparative advantage index was calculated for each type 
of product in 2004, based on data from several sources: the World Bank for manufactured goods 
(Nicita and Ollareaga, 2006), and UNCTAD for unprocessed agricultural and petroleum products. The 
goal of this analysis is to see whether sectors in which African countries have a comparative advantage 
are also sectors with a high intensity of trade with China.  As the intensity of trade varies widely, we 
restricted the analysis to products that are included in the top 25% ranked according to Africa’s 
comparative advantage (by value),   
Africa has a substantial comparative advantage in unprocessed agricultural products, and the correlation 
between country indices of comparative advantage and Africa-China trade intensity is low, but positive 
(figure 18). Chinese agriculture is not competitive, China has reduced import barriers significantly 
since joining the WTO, and China has entered into trade agreements providing for zero tariffs with 
many African countries (Fan 2007).  Thus there should be considerable potential for African economies 
to benefit from exporting agricultural products to China.  However, agricultural exports to China are 
only about 3% of Africa’s total agricultural exports (Brazil, the United States and Canada dominate 
China’s agricultural imports), and these exports are concentrated in a few products from a limited 
number of countries. As noted above, China’s increased demand for agricultural products has pushed 
up prices, with implications for African economies depending on whether they are net exporters or net 
importers. For instance, there is limited coincidence between China’s agricultural import demand and 
Southern African countries’ export supply: “In particular, none of the top exports of Tanzania appears 
as top imports of China”. So, on the surface, it looks as though the effects of China on SA’s exports due 
to direct demand are negligible” (Villoria, 2009, p.5). 
 
                                                 
9  This indicator is more difficult to interpret when the two countries are of very different sizes. For some African countries 
with a modest economic size, the denominator is almost entirely made up of Chinese trade   26
Figure 18: Comparative advantage and trade intensity: agricultural sector 
 
MLI=Mali, BUR=Burkina-Faso, BEN=Benin, COG=Rep. of Congo, CAF=Central Africa, ZWE=Zimbabwe, 
UGA=Uganda, LBR=Liberia, TGO=Togo, KEN=Kenya, ETH=Ethiopia, SOM=Somalia, TZA=Tanzania, ZMB=Zambia, 
CMR=Cameroon, ZAR=D.R. Congo, TCD=Chad, GAB=Gabon, MWI=Malawi, EGY=Egypt. 
With regard to oil, Congo has the highest comparative advantage, followed by  Chad and Angola 
(figure 19). The correlation between countries’ revealed comparative advantage and the intensity of 
trade with China is positive and fairly high (0.26); it is the most significant of the three sector groups. 
China’s desire to obtain secure energy supplies is well known, and it is likely that Chinese demand for 
oil will continue to rise, while Africa has significant reserves. This amounts to a relationship of 
complementarity. Moreover, Africa offers better quality oil than that of the Middle Eastern countries 
and represents a source of diversification of supply for China. “The African oil and gas markets hold a 
number of attractions for the Chinese. First, China prefers sweet crude oil which is low in sulphur 
contents to blend with more sour variables that they import from the Middle East. There is therefore 
fierce competition over the existing supplies of sweet crude from Africa. Second, for energy security, 
China is trying to diversify supply sources from Middle East countries to more stable African countries. 
Third, among all SSA oil producing countries, Nigeria is the only member of OPEC. Hence, fears about 
production quota and other controls by the cartel will have little impact on the quest for oil and gas 
from the continent”. (Adenikinju and Bamou, 2006). Rising oil prices and profit margins have made it 
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Figure 19: Comparative advantage and trade intensity: oil sector 
 
COG=Rep. of Congo, AGO=Angola, TCD=Chad, DZA=Algeria, NGA=Nigeria, SDN=Sudan, LBY=Libya, GAB=Gabon, 
GNQ=Equatorial Guinea, CMR=Cameroon, EGY=Egypt, KEN=Kenya, SEN=Senegal. 
African economies’ highest comparative advantage in manufactures and processed goods is in metals 
(Mozambique), tobacco (Benin), refined oil (Algeria, Egypt and Kenya), timber and manufacture of 
wood and cork products (Cameroon) and food processing (Mauritius). Morocco enjoys a comparative 
advantage in several manufactured products, various food processing industries, chemicals, etc. Thus 
there is potential for Africa to compete with China in selected manufactures. China also provides an 
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Figure 20: Comparative advantage and trade intensity: manufactured sector 
 
MUS=Mauritius, CIV=Cote d’Ivoire, MWI=Malawi, GHA=Ghana, ETH=Ethiopia, CMR=Cameroon, EGY=Egypt, 
KEN=Kenya, GAB=Gabon, MAR, DZA=Algeria, MOZ=Mozambique, NGA=Nigeria, BEN=Benin, BWA=Botswana. 
There is a negative correlation between the intensity of trade with China and the degree of an African 
economies’ comparative advantage in manufactures and processed goods (figure 20). This suggests that 
trade with China does not, on balance, encourage the expansion of Africa’s manufactures and processed 
goods industries. Thus trade with China could encourage African economies to remain specialised in 
raw materials, which implies high vulnerability to commodity prices and a higher probability of 
corruption. It also limits the opportunity for the development of agricultural and industrial production 
towards higher value added products.  
FDI by China can also generate important benefits for Africa. There is some evidence that China’s 
investments in Africa have encouraged similar steps by other emerging economies, although the official 
statistics do not yet show this.  For example, India’s engagement with Africa has increased with the 
Africa-India summit in April 2008.  
Investment in agriculture is very important for African governments due to food security needs. China 
is committed to supporting research and innovation in Africa through building technology centres, 
sending scientists to transfer technology to African countries, and helping to upgrade African products, 
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possible for several African countries to boost their production and exports  (Besada et al., 2008). For 
example, China provided Zimbabwe technical assistance (including training in irrigation and 
developing smallholdings) to improve the value added of its exports by developing cigarette 
manufacturing instead of exporting tobacco.  
The oil and natural resource sectors attract the majority of Chinese investment, which have been 
accompanied by the establishment of service businesses that are highly competitive in terms of salaries, 
costs and expertise. This could have a negative effect on local employment and have implications on 
host government local content policies (Adenikinju and Bamou, 2006). There are also positive effects 
because Chinese investments in services could reduce the price of services facing African firms, and 
high-priced and inefficient services are an important constraint on development in Africa. However, the 
energy sector in many countries has lacked transparency, has encouraged extensive rent-seeking, and 
has been connected with government corruption, to the detriment of improving the income levels of the 
population.  
The Chinese presence has also permitted the building of a local industry. “Chinese investments “have 
helped to build local capacity, transfer technology and raise exports levels to several African states. In 
Zimbabwe, for instance, where tobacco has been among its top exports, Chinese investors have helped 
Zimbabwe process tobacco into cigarettes and export these as finished value-added products. Chinese 
investors and local companies have also formed joint ventures to establish a large cement factory in 
Gweru to meet national demand. These Chinese investments can be found in a wide variety of sectors, 
including so-called fragile states and projects that western investors have seemingly deemed too risky” 
(cf. Besada et al., 2008, p.11). Such efforts need to be tied to a national development strategy (Ajakaiye 
et al., 2009) to encourage the development of backward and forward linkages to African firms.   
Moreover, certain works have shown that Chinese FDI and trade in Africa are complementary (Mo and 
Liu, 2008). Lastly, the services sector has benefited from Chinese investments in telecommunications 
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6. Governance and Economic Policy 
Despite various definitions, there is a consensus that governance encompasses institutions with the 
capacity to ensure the rule of law, respect for individual freedoms and a democratic political regime 
(Kaufman and Kraay, 2008). In recent years, international organisations and bilateral aid agencies from 
traditional donors have made their assistance conditional on good governance. China, on the contrary, 
makes a clear distinction between economics and politics in its interventions in Africa. This position 
has led China to support undemocratic regimes, raising concerns about its contribution to the 
development of governance in African countries. Africa cannot expect assistance from China to 
improve governance, which can only result from internal choices and consultations between the State 
and its citizens. However, a number of recommendations can be suggested to limit the negative effects 
on governance of China’s presence in Africa: 
1.  Trade and FDI in the natural resource sector tend to impair governance and efficiency, have 
harmed the environment, and often failed to lead to a reduction of poverty. Moreover, the oil 
sector’s demand for resources has often reduced manufacturing production (due to the 
Dutch disease effect) and has been associated with imprudent macroeconomic policies 
resulting in high levels of volatility. The weak impact of oil or mineral exports on poverty 
reduction has often been highlighted in the literature (Adenikinju and Bamou, 2006).
10 
Countries with substantial oil reserves need to be particularly careful to ensure strong, 
democratic institutions, to pursue prudent fiscal policies (ensuring efficient public 
expenditures and avoiding excessive monetary expansion), and to allocate a portion of oil 
revenues towards investment in the non-tradable sectors (Iimi, 2006). 
2.  The sharp increase in revenues resulting from Chinese demand must be managed by 
increasing savings in times of economic boom and making  provisions for social assistance, 
particularly for the unemployed, during downturns. The OECD (Goldstein et al., 2006) cites 
the example of Chile’s countercyclical policies and recommends the application of 
Hartwick’s rule (1977). This rule states that a constant level of consumption can be 
maintained in a rent-based economy if the amount of investment is equal to the value of rent 
accrued from the natural resource, at all times. Funds have been set up to save the rents from 
                                                 
10  This situation is facilitated by the lax practices of some Chinese partners, but it also stems primarily from internal 
institutional weaknesses. For example, Congo-Kinshasa with its vast mineral reserves of copper, cobalt, etc. is very poor, 
because of the State’s inability to collect tax revenue from thousands of companies that are beyond its control.   31
oil windfalls in Nigeria and Botswana, and could be recommended more broadly to stabilize 
expenditures over the commodity price cycle (absorbing resources when commodity prices 
rise and spending resources when they fall). 
3.  African countries need to increase the value added of their production and exports, 
irrespective of their partner countries. This implies developing specialisations that may 
justify limited protectionist measures (Geda, 2006). For example, local content 
requirements, not only for Chinese investors, but for all investors could be expanded to 
increase the demand for unskilled African labour and local construction material for 
investment projects.  
4.  Trade growth can be associated with increasing inequality. Zafar (2007) emphasizes that 
trade with China contributes to an improvement in the terms of trade for resource-rich 
countries and a deterioration for resource-poor countries. The same distributional effects can 
be seen within a country, where workers and firms in the oil and mineral sectors see 
increasing incomes while agriculture and manufactures sectors see reductions.  Such 
changes in income distribution can increase the risk of social unrest, particularly where oil 
or minerals production is concentrated in particular regions. 
5.  As described above, China enjoys significant benefits from its integration in the Asian 
region. Similarly, African countries may be able to reap significant benefits from furthering 
regional integration in respect to the rules governing Chinese investment. For example, 
collaboration among African governments could be useful in stipulating minimum levels of 
local employment in Chinese-owned firms.  
 
Economic policy suggestions can only be envisaged by taking into consideration the specific nature of 
individual countries. The influx of financial and human resources from China generate short-term 
mutual benefits and can enhance complementarities between China and Africa. However, reaping the 
full benefits of this collaboration will require that African governments strengthen their governance 
institutions. This would require stronger interaction between African civil society organizations and 
their respective governments. Stronger governance institutions would have a beneficial impact on 
implementation of social and environmental safeguards as well as encourage the use of African labour 
and local construction companies to support major investment projects. Such regulations would not   32
only apply to Chinese investors, but to all investors from other countries as per the WTO agreement. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1: Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) 
“The concept of RCA pertains to the relative trade performances of individual countries in particular 
commodities. On the assumption that the commodity pattern of trade reflects inter-country differences 
in relative costs as well as in non-price factors, this is assume to reveal the comparative advantage of 
trading countries”, B.Balassa, 1977. 
 




xij represents exports of country i in product j 
 
Xit represents total exports of country i in year t 
 
xwj represents exports of country w (China) in product j 
 
Xwt represents total exports of country w in year t 
 
Annex 2: Nomenclature of Manufactured and Processed Goods 
Description of manufactured products/industrially processed products 
Manufactured products used in this paper were disaggregated according to International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC)-3-digit, Rev 2. The list of industrial products, according to this 














- Articles of wood  
 
- Paper 
- Printing Work 
- Chemicals 
- Refined Petroleum and Petroleum Derivatives 
- Rubber 
- Plastics 
- Stoneware and Porcelain 
- Glass 
 
- Processed and Cast Iron 
- Metallic Structures 
-Machines and Machinery  
- Electrical 
- Transport Equipment 
- Medical and Surgical Equipment 
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